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Introduction 
Ken Oliphant, Zhang Pingua and Chen Lei 
I. Starting points 
1 Three recent decisions provide informative case studies of how Chinese courts 
have had to grapple with the complexities of liability for interference with per-
sonality rights in the years since the turn of the century: 
Without obtaining permission, Life Style newspaper used a picture of Liu 
Xiang, superstar of Chinese track and field athletics who won the gold 
medal in the 110 metre hurdles at the 2004 Beijung Olympics, to advertise 
the opening of a new department store. Liu claimed RMB 1.25 million in 
damages, but was ultimately awarded only RMB 20,000, this amount being 
compensation for his mental anguish rather than disgorgement of Life 
Style’s unjust enrichment; the court also ordered Life Style to make a pub-
lic apology.1 
A group of medical students doing internships at the defendant hospital 
observed a woman’s abortion surgery without her knowledge and consent. 
As the operation was under anaesthetic, the patient was unaware of this at 
the time, but she felt deeply offended when she learned of it afterwards. 
                                                          
1 Liu Xiang v Life Style Newspaper [2005] Beijing No 1 Immediate Court, Civil Appeal 
case no 8144. See Chen Lei, Codifying Personality Rights in China: Legislative Innova-
tion or Scaremongering?, this volume, no 30. 
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She sued the hospital for invasion of her right to privacy and was awarded 
RMB 10,000 as compensation for mental suffering.2 
The plaintiff conducted searches on Baidu, the largest Chinese search en-
gine service provider, using the terms ‘weight loss’, ‘breast enhancement’ 
and ‘abortion’. When she subsequently accessed other websites, advertise-
ments relating to the search terms popped up in her browser. She claimed 
that Baidu had used cookies to collected her personal information and dis-
closed that information to third parties for commercial advertisement. She 
requested an injunction and damages for mental distress. However, the 
court found that the information was not personal to her as cookies identify 
only the browser being used and not the user. Further, Baidu had placed a 
notice on its search page to inform users that they could opt out of the use 
of cookies and so, by proceeding to use the search engine without opting 
out, the plaintiff had impliedly agreed to accept cookies. Her claim there-
fore failed.3 
2 In fact, the recognition and protection of personality rights in China is not a 
creation of the 21st century but goes back at least as far as the General Princi-
ples of Civil Law (GPCL) of 1986, in which the following are specified as ‘per-
sonal rights’ (art 98 ff): life and health; personal name; portrait; reputation; hon-
our and marriage by choice.4 The Tort Liability Law (TLL) of 2009 expressly 
adds to this (non-exhaustive) list the right of privacy (art 2).5 These legislative 
texts are reinforced by authoritative interpretations and guidance issued by the 
Supreme People’s Court.6 Yet the legal protection of personality rights remains 
a much discussed and controversial issue in China and this debate has been 
given renewed impetus in recent years by repeated calls to introduce new leg-
islation. Indeed, Chen Lei states at the outset of his chapter in this collection 
that how to legislate personality rights has been ‘the most controversial issue in 
Chinese civil law’ in the last few years—in particular, whether there should be 
a separate book on personality rights in the future Chinese Civil Code.7 
3 Against that backdrop, we hope that this investigation of the legal protection of 
personality rights in Europe and China will both inform the Chinese debate and 
introduce non-Chinese readers to the arguments made and their legal context. 
                                                          
2  Liang v Qingdao People’s Hospital (unreported, 2003), cited by Ding Chunyan, Protec-
tion of Patient Personality Rights in China, this volume, no 22. 
3  Beijing Baidu Technology Ltd v Zhu Ye (2014) Ning Min Zhong Zi no 5028, cited by Jia 
Wang, The Right to Privacy in the Internet Age: The Chinese Perspective, this volume, no  
4  English translation available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/con-
tent_1383941.htm. As to the statutory framework, see further Chen (fn 1) no 5 ff. 
5  English translation available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2011-02/16/con-
tent_1620761.htm. See also  
6  Chen (fn 1) no 8. 
7  Ibid no 1. 
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II. The structure of this book 
4 This book is divided into three parts, providing general overviews of the legal 
protection of personality rights in Europe (Part I) and in China (Part II), before 
addressing a number of specific contexts in which protecting personality rights 
raises important and distinctive issues (Part III). 
A. The legal protection of personality rights in Europe 
5 In her helpful remarks in Chapter 1, Barbara Steininger sets out the basic ques-
tions that should be answered in investigating the protection accorded by law 
to interests in personality.8 The three questions she highlights are the following: 
(1) What interests in personality does the law protect and what is the scope of 
such protection? (2) Which legal mechanisms are employed to provide this pro-
tection?; and (3) How are the general rules applied to specific areas such as the 
mass media and the internet? The ways in which European legal systems an-
swer the first and second of these questions are then pursued in further detail in 
the contributions to this volume of Eva Ondreasova9 and Monika Hinteregger.10  
6 Looking at the interests protected, Ondreasova first provides an overview of the 
historical evolution of different approaches from the time of Roman law on-
wards, then highlights for systematic analysis the issue of whether the law 
should recognise a single all-encompassing personality right or a ‘bundle’ of 
specific rights. In her view, each approach has its competing advantages and 
disadvantages. The adoption of a single personality right of general scope gives 
the courts freedom to develop the law in response to social change, allowing 
new aspects of personality to be granted recognition and protection as the need 
becomes apparent. Conversely, the task of filling in the content of the general 
right is left to the courts, who may be ill-suited to resolving difficult questions 
of balance as between the opposing interests involved. It is not clear that courts 
are better placed than legislators to identify and reflect social values and atti-
tudes. Specifying a long list of protected aspects of personality, on the other 
hand, has the merit of making explicit what elsewhere has to be drawn out by 
interpretation, but it may leave gaps as well as (one might add) tending to ‘fos-
silise’ the law in an area that is peculiarly subject to changing social attitudes. 
Further, in the absence of any explicit hierarchy of interests, it may be under-
stood as placing all aspects of personality on the same level, thereby obscuring 
                                                          
8  Barbara C Steininger, The Protection of Personality Rights in Comparative Perspective: 
Basic Questions, this volume. 
9  Eva Ondreasova, Personality Rights in Different European Legal Systems: Privacy, Dig-
nity, Honour and Reputation, this volume. 
10  Monika Hinteregger, The Protection of Personality Rights in Private Law: Remedies, this 
volume. 
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some important differences between the different aspects of personality that are 
legally protected.  
7 In fact, whichever approach is adopted, it is important to bear in mind that per-
sonality rights (narrowly so-called) are a subset of interests in the person that 
differ from the absolute rights to life, health and bodily security by virtue of the 
qualified protection they receive. The rights to honour, reputation and privacy 
are qualified rather than absolute rights – in the sense that they must be weighed 
against opposing interests such as freedom of expression and the freedom of 
the press. This balancing process is of the essence in determining whether a 
violation of personality rights has occurred, irrespective of whether the ‘single 
right’ or ‘bundle of rights’ approach is taken.  
8 The final section of Ondreasova’s paper examines the scope of protection given 
by different European legal systems to particular interests in personality: dig-
nity, honour and reputation; privacy; image and likeness (with separate analysis 
of the topic of commercial appropriation); personal identity; and self-determi-
nation. She submits persuasively that privacy is the overarching category into 
which all legally protected interests in personality other than dignity, honour 
and reputation can be fitted. 
9 Addressing the legal mechanisms that protect the various interests in personal-
ity, Hinteregger identifies four distinct aims: (1) compensation; (2) prevention; 
(3) restoration of the pre-existing state of affairs (status quo ante); and (4) res-
toration of unjustly acquired gains. The law of tort is crucial to the first of these 
aims, and arguably to the second and third too—assuming one views injunc-
tions as remedies in tort. Tort compensates for the losses consequential on the 
interference, and the threat of liability in damages provides an incentive that 
deters future interference. Injunctions constitute a more direct mechanism to 
prevent the repetition or continuation of behaviour that violates personality 
rights (prohibitory injunctions) and to require the defendant to take positive 
steps to restore the plaintiff’s pre-tort position (mandatory injunctions). It may 
be added that, in modern legal systems, such orders are often supplemented by 
specific provisions relating to (for example) the removal of offensive content 
from websites or the printing of apologies or corrections in respect of defama-
tory newspaper stories.11 
10 In principle, a rational legal system would make the remedy proportionate to 
the circumstances that allow it to be invoked. Greater fault, for example, war-
rants a remedial response of greater severity, all other things being equal. Along 
these lines, Barbara Steininger suggests in her chapter that injunctions, typically 
involving less serious consequences for the defendant, should be available in a 
wider range of cases than the remedy of compensatory damages – for example, 
where there is an immediate risk of harm but no fault (even in circumstances 
                                                          
11  As explored in some of the contributions to Part 3 of this volume. 
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where fault would be need to establish a liability in damages).12 No doubt the 
proposed principle of proportionality embodies good legal sense, but it is not 
clear that all would accept that injunctions generally involve less serious con-
sequences for the defendant than compensatory damages. Common law sys-
tems, in particular, have traditionally been reluctant to grant injunctions or other 
forms of what is known as ‘specific relief’, precisely because the interference 
with the defendant’s liberty of action thereby entailed is viewed as typically 
more serious than the imposition of an obligation to pay damages – which may 
be viewed as licensing or at least tolerating the defendant’s interference with 
the plaintiff’s rights. Thus, it is a general principle that no injunction should be 
granted where damages would be an adequate remedy – and this applies not 
only for past infringements but also for possible infringements in the future, 
which may be ‘licensed’ in advance.13 
11 The three chapters mentioned so far in relation to Part I of this book were con-
ceived as and form a coherent set. The fourth – by Ernst Karner – was not writ-
ten as part of the same set, but it nevertheless usefully ties together some of the 
themes elaborated in the other contributions, while exploring in more detail the 
influence in this area of human rights law.14 He emphasises the manifold and 
diverse character of interests in personality interests and the consequent need 
to identify different categories attracting different degrees of protection. He also 
underlines that personality rights are interdependent with constitutional rights, 
the latter not being directly enforceable in ordinary private law but having in-
direct effect. As an example he cites the 1975 decision of the Austrian Supreme 
Court to award damages for non-pecuniary loss consequent upon false impris-
onment by the Austrian state – notwithstanding earlier decisions going the other 
way – having regard to the right to liberty and security recognised in art 5 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).15 Karner then shows how 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has acted as a driving force be-
hind legal harmonisation in Europe, especially in resolving the conflict between 
the competing rights of privacy (art 8 ECHR) and freedom of expression (art 10 
ECHR). The same may also be said in respect of the final area that Karner 
touches upon – the legal consequences of a violation of personality rights – as 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has been influential in several legal systems in en-
couraging awards of or non-pecuniary damages for violations of personality 
rights even where there is no express basis for this in national law.16  
                                                          
12  Steininger (fn 8)  
13  See generally K Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, in: id (ed), The Law of Tort 
(3rd edn, 2015). 
14  Ernst Karner, Human Rights and the Protection of Personality Rights in Europe: Compar-
ative Reflections, this volume. 
15  OGH in SZ 48/69 = JBl 1975, 645, cited in Karner (fn 14) no 22. 
16  K Oliphant, Comparative Remarks, in: H Koziol/BC Steininger (eds), European Tort Law 
2007) (2008) no 5 f. 
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B. The legal protection of personality rights in China 
12 Opening Part II of this book, Chen Lei examines the extent to which personality 
rights are currently protected in China, highlighting the plethora of legal provi-
sions that perform this function and the fragmented and unsystematic approach 
that results.17 As noted at the start of this Introduction, the GPCL and TLL both 
identify in non-exhaustive terms a variety of interests in personality that are 
protected by law, the latter in more detail than the former. Article 2 TLL ex-
pressly protects the right to life, the right to health, the right to name, the right 
to reputation, the right to honour, the right to self-image, the right of privacy 
and the right of marital autonomy. The extent of this protection is clarified by 
authoritative interpretations and guidance promulgated by the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court. Additionally, a number of other legal sources – including not only 
the Constitution but also the laws of civil and criminal procedure, substantive 
criminal law, administrative law and consumer law – address personality rights 
in ways that augment or overlap with the protection provided by the TLL. A 
table on p 000 provides a helpful overview of the personality rights protected 
by Chinese law, the source of that protection, and the remedies available on 
their violation (see especially art 15 TLL, which refers amongst other things to 
cessation of infringements, removal of obstacles, rehabilition and elimination 
of ill effects, in addition to compensation for damage). In a very useful annex 
to his chapter Chen provides English translations of legislative texts relating to 
the protection of specific personality rights. 
13 Mirroring the discussion in Part I of the book, Chen then discusses the interplay 
between the rival approaches based respectively on one general personality 
right and on a set of specific personality rights. In his view, the concept of a 
general personality right is too abstract to be practically useful as it is still nec-
essary to concretise specific rights of personality on the varied facts of individ-
ual cases. He doubts whether Chinese courts can be entrusted with the task of 
identifying new instances of such rights in responsible fashion, in view of social 
changes. Hence, he proposes that it would be practical for China to develop a 
legislative model which combines a ‘stick’ of specific rights entailing the vari-
ous remedial measures with the recognition of general rights located in the gen-
eral part of a future Chinese Civil Code.18 
14 Chen then provides an overview of the debate currently raging as to the desira-
bility of codifying personality rights as an independent book in a future Chinese 
Civil Code. He concludes that the form that personality rights protection takes 
is less important than its substance. For  him,  in  so  far  as  there  is  a  declar-
ative provision recognizing protection of personality rights in the general part 
of a future Chinese Civil Code, coupled with concrete remedial provisions in 
                                                          
17  Chen (fn 1). 
18  In the civil rights section of the General Provisions of Civil Law, which was passed on 15 
March 2017, art 113 provides for a list of personality rights which fall within the scope of 
the Law’s protection 
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the tll or in a separate book on personality rights and restitution for unjust en-
richment, that would not cause many concerns. 
15 The issue of the introduction of a statutory right of personality is also taken up, 
at a rather more abstract level, by the other contribution in Part II of the book, 
written by Zhang Pinghua.19 Stressing the multi-dimensional structure of the 
interest in personality, Zhang distinguishes between its inherent and derivative 
aspects. Only the former is essential to what makes humans human. The influ-
ence of European, particularly German, legal theory here is especially evident 
in Zhang’s appeal to the socially typical and manifest nature (in German: sozi-
altypische Offenkundigkeit) of this inherent interest in personality. By contrast, 
the derivative interests in personality have not received the same degree of so-
cial acceptance and are not protected to the same extent. Zhang argues that in-
troducing a statutory right of personality would enable clarification of its 
boundaries and a distinction to be drawn between specific rights in personality 
as such, which cannot be sold or otherwise transferred, and rights which are 
more akin to rights in property, such as the right to the commercial value of 
one’s image. 
C. Specific aspects of the legal protection of personality  
16 As Barbara Steininger explains in the first chapter of this collection,20 one of 
the basic questions relating to the legal protection of personality is how the 
general rules specifying the interests protected, the scope of that protection and 
the legal mechanisms employed to provide it are applied in specific contexts. 
This, the subject matter of Part III of the book, provides particularly illuminat-
ing evidence of the qualified rather than absolute character of personality rights 
and the consequent need to weigh them against opposing interests such as free-
dom of expression. The papers collected here demonstrate that cultural and so-
cial context plays a large role both in the identification of relevant rights and 
countervailing interests, and in the balance to be struck between them. 
17 The first two papers encountered here look at the particular threats to personal-
ity interests posed by the internet and the specific responses to them in Europe 
and China respectively. Modern social media make it easy to post, tweet or 
otherwise comment on others in derotagory, offensive or intrusive fashion, 
thoughtlessly, and under the cloak of anonymity. Being unconstrained by phys-
ical form, such communications can often be read by anyone anywhere in the 
world. At the same time, ‘big data’ technologies instantaneously and almost 
costlessly accumulate massively large, diverse and complex datasets whose 
                                                          
19  Zhang Pinghua, The Structure of the Interest in Personality and the Introduction of a Stat-
utory Right of Personality, this volume. 
20  Steininger (fn 8). 
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subjects are increasingly vulnerable to damaging breaches of privacy in cyber-
space.  
18 In her paper on personality rights and the internet in Europe, Laura Emilia 
Weissel inquires specifically into the potential subjects of tortious liability (the 
interet user, the internet service provider (ISP) or even the search engine) and 
identifies the cardinal question regarding the liability of host providers in par-
ticular as the extent of their obligation to monitor stored information.21 The 
same actors face liability under boadly equivalent provisions of Chinese law, 
which are identified and critically analysed in the paper contributed to this vol-
ume by Wang Jia.22 Both Weissel and Wang highlight recent litigation regard-
ing the particular position of search engines: in China, the Baidu case men-
tioned above; in Europe, a set of cases in different countries addressing 
Google’s liability for ‘auto complete’ suggestions and ‘snippets’, and litigation 
around ‘the right to be forgotten’ in the EU Court of Justice.23 The global reach 
of the internet means that the same issues will arise for resolution around the 
world, but how they are resolved will inevitably reflect both the applicable legal 
rules and wider social and cultural factors. 
19 Regarding China, Wang highlights how privacy was not included amongst the 
personality rights specified in the General Principles of Civil Law of 1986 and, 
despite the inclusion of a right to privacy among the ‘civil rights and interests’ 
whose infringement is subject to tortious liability (art 2 TLL), its recognition is 
limited to the area of tort law and thus remains incomplete – hence the calls for 
an independent law of personality rights. In Wang’s view, this would facilitate 
the recognition of application of remedies not available under the TLL, notably 
the disgorgement of profits obtained through the unauthorised commercial ex-
ploitation of personal information. She stresses, however, tha privacy is only 
one of several goals that warrant legal protection and have to be balanced 
against each other in modern Chinese society; these also include security, self-
development, freedom of speech, accountability and social productivity. 
20 The balance between personality rights and freedom of expression is further 
pursued in the context of the mass media in the next chapter of the book, au-
thored by Thomas Thiede.24 Like Karner in his paper in Part I, summarised 
above, Thiede underscores the role of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in driving developments in national law, particularly in the balance to 
be struck between the right to private life (art 8 ECHR) and freedom of expres-
sion (art 10 ECHR). He offers a survey of leading decisions by the European 
Court of Human Rights, in which he identifies a change of emphasis over time: 
press freedom is no longer accorded the same priority it once had, at least when 
                                                          
21  Laura Emilia Weissel, Personality rights and the Internet in Europe, this volume. 
22  Wang Jia, The Right to Privacy in the Internet Age: The Chinese Perspective, this volume. 
23  Weissel (fn 21) no 22 ff. 
24  Thomas Thiede, Personality Rights, the Mass Media and the  
European Convention on Human Rights, this volume. 
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if comes to statements of fact rather than opinion, and the constraints on its 
exercise when it impinges on countervailing interests – including the personal-
ity rights of others – have become notably more significant over the years. 
Thiede broadly approves of this trend and in particular applauds the willingness 
of the ECtHR to limit freedom of expression in respect of intrusions by mass 
media into the private lives of individuals where this does not contribute to a 
relevant public debate but satisfies only the prurient interests of the con-
sumer. 
21 The final two papers in this collection take us to other, perhaps less obvious 
areas of Chinese law. First, Ding Chunyan looks at the protection of personality 
rights in the medical context, especially through the ideas of patient autonomy 
(reflected in the right to informed consent specified in art 55 f TLL) and pri-
vacy, the latter embracing both freedom from intrusion and rights over private 
information.25 She finds that current Chinese law is too ready to restrict the 
protection given to patients’ personality rights for reasons of medical paternal-
ism, social morality and the public interest in security, justice and public health. 
It thereby creates a risk of undermining the inherent value of human dignity and 
the scope for personal development. 
22 Lastly, Fan Liying considers personality rights in the context of the laws of 
marriage in China, with reference to the freedom to chose one’s family name 
on marriage, and the right to return to one’s original name on divorce, bereave-
ment or even during the marriage, each spouse’s right of cohabitation, and how 
it is reconciled with their right of sexual freedom, and their right to reproductive 
autonomy.26 Her account reveals a set of complex interactions between person-
ality rights and both the countervailing rights of others and the public interest, 
in an area where the legal principles are strongly shaped by cultural values and 
liability rules have to find their right place amongst a range of other legal re-
sponses (eg divorce). 
                                                          
25  Ding Chunyan, Protection of Patient Personality Rights in China, this volume. 
26  Fan Liying, On the Independence of Personalities and Restrictions on the Status of 
Spouses, this volume. 
